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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
(Secretary John Kerry) 
FROM: LEO C DORSEY 
RE: SECURING HIGH-RISK DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES 
 
Action Forcing Event 
Recent attacks on US embassies, from Benghazi to Ankara, have exposed weaknesses in 
high-risk, high threat embassy and consulate security features. 1  State Department’s 
Accountability Review Board (ARB) has released a report linking security failures with 
an inability to meet minimum security standards at new diplomatic posts, particularly in 
high-risk areas.2  
Statement of the Problem 
The threat of attack on our embassies has grown and is unlikely to subside in the wake of 
violent strikes in Kenya, Benghazi and the like over the past two decades.3   Among the 
obstacles, a Department of State report listed in 1998 that “195 (80%) of its overseas 
facilities did not meet security standards and should be replaced.”4   Though Congress 
appropriated additional funding for security upgrades in response, State has only 
completed 80 to 90 new facilities since, leaving over 110 unfinished security upgrades, 
15 of which exist within high threat areas.5  During the same period, from 1998 to 2012, 
273 “significant attacks were carried out against U.S. Diplomatic facilities and personnel, 
                                                          
1 Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad:  Legislative and Executive 
Branch Initiatives.  Congressional Research Service.  May 7, 2014. 
2 Accountability Review Board (ARB) Report.  U.S. Department of State. December 19, 2012. 
3 “Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel, 1998-2012.”  U.S. Department of 
State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security.  July 2013.   
4 Epstein, Susan and Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: 
Background and Policy Issues.”  Congressional Research Service.  May 28, 2014.  Pages 8 & 9 
5 Ibid. Pages 8 & 9. 
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according to an independent report by the State Department.”6    Some believe that failure 
to address this problem in some manner will continue to put our diplomatic staff at risk.   
The inability of the State Department’s (hereafter referred to as the Department) Bureau 
of Diplomatic Security (DS) to secure our embassies is the result of three challenges.  
First, DS is losing the competing battle between projecting visually pleasing, values 
inspired appearances at our embassies and the far more secure “fortress” style facility 
structure.  The trend toward the former, which is currently supported by Secretary of 
State John Kerry and has been instituted since 2010, has resulted in less formidable 
defense systems at our diplomatic posts since the “fortress” style was initially promoted 
in 2001, according to DS.7   
Second, the increase of high-risk, high threat diplomatic posts has not been met with a 
standardized risk management policy to evaluate the feasibility of so-called 
“expeditionary diplomacy” missions, a term referring to diplomacy at high-threat posts.8  
This, coupled with the prevalence of security “waivers” for high-risk, high threat 
diplomatic compounds which do not fulfill minimum security standards has significantly 
increased the risk to our Foreign Service and ambassadorial personnel.  U.S. special 
missions that existed under these waivers, such as Benghazi, are at increased risk 
following the events of the Iraq and Afghan war and the growth of non-state terrorist 
                                                          
6 Sullivan, Mark, and Todd, Keil and others.  “Report of the Independent Panel on Best Practices.”  U.S. 
Department of State.  August 29, 2013.  p. 13 
7 Epstein, Susan and Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: 
Background and Policy Issues.”  Congressional Research Service.  May 28, 2014.  Page 9 
8 Cordesman, Anthony.  “The Death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, the Need for “Expeditionary 
Diplomacy,” and the Real Lesssons for U.S. Diplomacy.”  Center for Strategic & International Studies.  
October 11, 2012. 
And “Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to Gaps in Security-Related 
Activities, Standards and Policies.” U.S. Government Accountability Office.   June 25, 2014. 
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actors.9  Failure to create a standardized risk analysis policy for the creation of high threat 
posts can instill a false sense of security on visiting diplomats and prevent an objective 
policy approach to protecting our facilities.    
Third, a cyclical funding process has been blamed by such think tanks as Stratfor for a 
succession of security failures, particularly as congressional attention turns elsewhere 
years after a significant attack.  The cyclical nature of funding can be viewed following 
the 1984 Beirut bombing, similar attacks in East Africa in 1998 and the Benghazi attacks 
of 2012 (see Table 1).  Each has been followed by an Accountability Review Board panel 
finding of inadequate funding, followed shortly thereafter by an increase in congressional 
appropriations.  Such congressional allocation patterns can be found in 2012 for 
Diplomatic Security (an increase of approx. $1.5 billion) and for embassy upgrades in 
2013 (increase of $1.2 billion).  Continued cycles of this nature virtually guarantee 
continued weaknesses in our overseas facilities, as it fails to consistently prioritize 
diplomatic security needs in the years following an attack.  10 
Combined, these weaknesses could expose the Department to future vulnerabilities.  The 
rise of such groups as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant11, ongoing turmoil 
following the Arab Spring12 and current tensions with Russia13 all have the potential to 
endanger our diplomatic personnel at a moment’s notice.  Further inability to safeguard 
                                                          
9 Green, Graham Jr. and Melrose, Joseph Jr. and others.  “Report on Diplomatic Security Organization and 
Management.”  U.S. Department of State.  May 2013 
10  Stewart, Scott. “The Benghazi Report and the Diplomatic Security Funding Cycle.”  Stratfor: Global 
Intelligence.   December 27, 2012. 
11 “Syria Iraq: The Islamic State militant group.”  BBC News.  August 2, 2014. 
12 Bishara, Marwan.  “Year Four: The seasons turn on the Arab Spring.”  Al Jazeera.  December 17, 2013. 
13 “Statement by the President on New Sanctions related to Russia.” White House Office of the Press 
Secretary.  September 11, 2014. 
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our compounds will expose the Department to further scrutiny on the Hill and prevent our 
diplomats from carrying out vital missions in the field. 
Table 1: Department of State Budget Allocations14 
(Approximate cost in millions) 
 
Fiscal Year 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Diplomatic 
Security 







1,500 2,600** 1,900 1,700 1,700 2,900 2,600 
(estimate) 
*(In 2013, funding for DS faced an 83 million dollar decrease.   An additional $6.2 million was shifted that 
year to a new “Worldwide Security Protection Program” to supplement DS)15 
**( “FY 2009 Actual includes $135.2 million for construction of overseas facilities for the United States 
Agency for  
International Development as provided by the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009; $41.3 million in bridge 
funding provided by the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008; and $921.5 million provided by the 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, of which $90.9 million is forward funding for FY 2010 
requirements.”  
Cost without additional funding- aprrox. 1,600 million.)16 
 
History 
Department security standards reform has evolved to what it is today in the aftermath of 
three significant attacks on our embassies, as well as the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001.  These embassy attacks include the 1983 Beirut bombings, the 1998 bombings 
in Kenya and Tanzania, and the most recent 2012 attacks on Special Mission Benghazi.  
In each instance, the Department initiated an Accountability Review Board (ARB) to 
examine flaws in its embassy and consulate security infrastructure.  The Department and 
                                                          
14 Congressional Budget Justification. Volumbe 1: Department of State Operations”  U.S. Department of 
State.  Fiscal Year 2008-2015 (each FY is contained within a separate report) 
15 Congressional Budget Justification. Volumbe 1: Department of State Operations”  U.S. Department of 
State.  Fiscal Year 2015. 
16 “Congressional Budget Justification. Volumbe 1: Department of State Operations”  U.S. Department of 
State.  Fiscal Year 2011. 
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Congress then initiated their own changes based upon the ARB.  This cycle has led critics 
to believe that the Department and Congress should have made security alterations 
outside of these time frames, as failures to do so in the past have led to recurring 
vulnerabilities.17 
The events of 9/11 had an additional, sweeping impact upon how our diplomats view 
acceptable risk.18  Following the attacks on U.S. soil, new reconstruction programs in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan gained prominence and expanded the need for 
expeditionary diplomacy at high-risk embassies.  This shift, which involved the 
“immediate transfer of 300 diplomatic positions from embassies in developed parts of the 
world to countries in need of transforming,” came to be known as “transformational 
diplomacy…derived from the administration’s ‘freedom agenda,’ which posited that any 
lack of freedom within other countries ultimately poses a threat to US security by 
creating the conditions for terrorism.” 19   
As part of this new shift, hundreds of diplomats were quickly shifted from developing 
countries to hardship posts such as “Baghdad and Kabul,” in order to promote “Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams and American Presence Posts” in co-operation with the 
Department of Defense, and expanded the role of high-risk expeditionary diplomacy in 
the Foreign Service.20  These ongoing efforts to promote nation building, now overseen 
                                                          
17 Pickering, Thomas and others.   “Accountability Review Board Report.”  U.S. Department of State. 
December 2012.   Page 3. 
18 Hanson, Thomas.  “The Traditions and Travails of Career Diplomacy in the United States.”  American 
Diplomacy. Ed. Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman.  Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012, Print. P. 206 
19 Ibid p. 207 
20 Ibid p. 207 
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by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO),21 have led to a significant 
re-shifting of diplomatic efforts to one of post-conflict revitalization and have expanded 
the need for diplomacy in high-risk areas.22   
In 1986, the substantial toll exacted upon our embassy in Beirut, Lebanon provided the 
impetus for the first ARB review of diplomatic security and risk assessment failure.  The 
ARB board was headed by Admiral Bobby Inman, whose recommendations resulted in 
the “Inman Standards” for U.S. embassy facilities, a security standard still strived for 
today.  However, these recommended standards, including a regular “setback” space 
between our embassies and their outer walls, were slowly phased out when congressional 
appropriations failed to meet the costs of a total security infrastructure shift. 23 According 
to a New York Times report, “the State Department estimated in 1986 that converting or 
replacing all embassies to meet the Inman standards would cost approximately $3.5 
billion.”  But while the Department requested $2.6 billion between 1986 and 1990, 
“Congress appropriated a total of about $880 million.”24  According to Jane Loeffler, 
author of The Architecture of Diplomacy, high-costs and the difficulties in designing and 
building new, more secure infrastructure, were in part to blame for the lack of enthusiasm 
from Congress.  Consequently, “Congress and the Administration quietly drop[ped] the 
idea of modifying all embassies to comply with the Inman standards.” 25   
                                                          
21 “About S/CRS.”  U.S. Department of State Archive.  Accessed Dec. 8, 2014. 
22 Grossman, Marc.  “Diplomacy: Before and After Conflict.”  Prism.  National Defense University Center 
for Complex Operations.  Prism 1, No. 4, Page 10 & 11 
23 “The Inman Report.  Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security.”  U.S. 
Department of State Archives. 1985.  
24 Risen, James. “Bombings in East Africa: The Security Issues; Bombed Embassies did not Meet 




However, Admiral Inman’s report findings were soon promulgated into law with the 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which among other 
things, established that the ARB should meet after “security related incidents” involving 
significant destruction of property or loss of life, as well as establishing a Diplomatic 
Security Bureau.26  In the years since the act was passed, 19 Accountability Review 
Board panels have met to review attacks of various scale.27 
The next major ARB was convened in 1998, after another major attack on our embassies, 
this time in Kenya and Tanzania.  Headed by William Crowe, a former ambassador to the 
United Kingdom and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush Sr. and Reagan, 
the report focused on insufficient funding to meet the standards laid out by Admiral 
Inman from the previous report.  In addition, the report pointed out that at the time “195 
(80%) of its overseas facilities did not meet security standards and should be replaced.”28  
A request for additional funding from Congress was laid out, and soon after the report’s 
findings were made clear, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 
1999 (SECCA) was enacted with additional appropriations and a requirement that the 
Department report to Congress diplomatic facilities which required “major security 
enhancements” each year.  In addition, the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations 
director was elevated to an “Assistant Secretary-equivalent Director/Chief Operating 
                                                          
26 “Bill Summary and Status-H.R. 4418: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986-(99th 
Congress 1985-1986).”    The Library of Congress, Thomas.  and Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. 
Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad:  Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives.  Congressional 
Research Service.  May 7, 2014. Page 12 
27 Zakaria, Tabassum and Cornwell, Susan.   “U.S. panel seeks accountability after Benghazi Attacks.”  
Reuters.  December 5, 2012 and  Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel 
Abroad:  Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives.  Congressional Research Service.  May 7, 2014. 
Page 12   
28 Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad:  Legislative and Executive 
Branch Initiatives.  Congressional Research Service.  May 7, 2014.  Page 8 
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Officer” and the office changed in name to the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations 
(OBO).29 
It was at this time that OBO instituted a “Standard Embassy Design (SED)” structure for 
expediently updating diplomatic facilities.  SED incorporated a framework of using “pre-
engineered design feature[s],” each separated into “small, medium and large” size and 
incorporating set security features such as the “high fences and 100-foot setbacks.” The 
features of these SED facilities closely embodied the principles of the 1998 ARB in its 
desire to place security over “historic or symbolic importance.”  These “fortress style 
structures,” as they came to be known, met swift criticism and were soon replaced by the 
adoption in 2010 of a new concept in government architecture, termed “Design 
Excellence,” a program which blends security concerns and accessibility within host 
nation cities.30  
But, as noted earlier, efforts to transition to either SED or Design Excellence (DE) 
security standards has so far not resulted in fully-updated overseas facilities.  This is 
demonstrated by the number of posts updated since the 1998 ARB report, at which time 
175 (80% of total) structures were identified as not meeting security standards.   Among 
these, only 80 to 90 have since been updated, and 15 remain labeled as high threat.  This 
presents a concerning trend considering current tensions in the Middle East.  At present, 
the Department of State lists its travel alert at “Worldwide Caution,” warning all 
                                                          
29Ibid.  Page 8 
30 Ibid. Page 9 
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American travelers of the potential for kidnappings or attacks from Al-Qaida and its 
affiliates on nearly all of the world’s continents.31 
The September 2012 attacks on Benghazi caused a third evaluation of embassy and 
consulate security standards.  Among other things, the Benghazi mission was faulted for 
possessing “temporary” status, allowing it to exist without minimum security standard 
requirements of any kind.  In addition, a Department security panel report pointed to a 
lack of a systematic risk analysis formula at high threat posts, which would allow it to 
analyze and assess the cost as well as benefits of traveling to such temporary facilities.32   
In addition, the panel recommended that minimum security standards be put in place for 
facilities which have little hope of fully meeting the Inman standards.33   
The 2012 ARB report further criticized Congress for not maintaining consistent funding 
support for worldwide embassy security upgrades despite repeated attacks and requests 
for aid by past ARB reports.  To remedy the shortfalls, and in light of tight congressional 
budgets, the 2012 Board recommended that Congress institute a “Capital Security Cost 
Sharing Program,” which requires all agencies using diplomatic facilities to contribute to 
its security costs, with funding prioritized toward embassies and consulates under high 
threat.34 
                                                          
31 Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad:  Legislative and Executive 
Branch Initiatives.  Congressional Research Service.  May 7, 2014. Page 10 and “Travel Alerts and 
Warnings.”  U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Consular Affairs-US Passports and International Travel.  
Last Updated: April 10, 2014.   
32 “Report of the Independent Panel on Best Practices.”  U.S. Department of State.  Washington D.C., 
August 29, 2013.  Page. 8, 12&  28 and Pickering, Thomas and others.   “Accountability Review Board 
Report. “ U.S. Department of State. December 2012.    
33 Epstein, Susan and Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: 
Background and Policy Issues.”  Congressional Research Service.  May 28, 2014.  Page 18 
34Pickering, Thomas and others..   “Accountability Review Board Report. “ U.S. Department of State. 
December 2012.   Page 9 
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Following the 2012 ARB recommendations, both chambers of Congress proposed 
changes to the Department’s security framework based closely on the ARB report’s 
findings.  Legislation in the 113th Congress regarding embassy security after Benghazi 
has taken two forms, and is included here due to its relevance to this recommendation’s 
final proposal.   At present, there are two pieces of legislation related to funding for 
embassy security upgrades under discussion in the 113th Congress.  The first, House 
Resolution 2848, the Department of State Operations and Embassy Security 
Authorization Act, contains requirements that the Secretary regularly updates Congress 
on their justification for opening or continued use of temporary and non-temporary 
facilities in high-risk, high threat areas.35  The act would also require that the Secretary 
seek forth an “emergency action plan includ[ing] the threat from complex attacks, 
and…rapid response procedures to include options for deployment of military resources.”  
The act further stresses support for the “Capital Security Cost Sharing Program,” while 
asserting that additional funds allotted from the program be prioritized toward high-risk, 
high threat posts.  Finally, among other things, the act requires that “key personnel” be 
placed at high-risk posts to ensure that future attacks may be foreseen and makes 
alterations to the bidding standard for “local guards and security agents,” so that local 
security is chosen based on best value standard, as opposed to a lowest price standard 
alone.36   
                                                          
35 “H.R. 2848- Department of State Operations and Embassy Security Authorization Act: 113th Congress 
(2013-2014).”  Library of Congress.  Accessed September 2014 and Epstein, Susan and Tiersky, Alex.  
“Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.”  
Congressional Research Service.  May 28, 2014.  Page 12. 
36 “H.R. 2848- Department of State Operations and Embassy Security Authorization Act: 113th Congress 
(2013-2014).”  Library of Congress-Congress.gov.  Accessed September 2014 
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Variations on the proposed changes suggested by H.R. 2848 can be found in a second 
piece of legislation currently proposed in the Senate. Senate bill 1386 Embassy Security, 
Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act would authorize a similar priority 
toward high-risk, high threat security upgrades from the Capital Security Cost Sharing 
Program.  In addition, S.1386 emphasized a need to train diplomatic personnel on 
security procedures at high-risk posts, and, like its House counterpart, requires the 
Secretary to report to Congress on the opening and continued use of diplomatic facilities 
in high threat areas around the globe each year.37  Alterations to the standards for contract 
bidding have also been provisioned to include a higher criterion for accepting local 
security protection proposals.  38   
Both pieces of legislation have addressed aspects of the three problems laid out at the 
beginning of this memorandum.  To address chronic security shortfalls, Congress and the 
Department have resorted to an increase in cost sharing, embodied within the Capital 
Security Cost Sharing Program.  To address risk analysis, the ARB report and Congress’s 
legislation contain references to forming a risk assessment program or a contingency plan 
in the event of an attack on our embassies, though neither specifies what form such a 
program would take.  While neither recommends actions against waivers, both 
recommend or include provisions that the Secretary regularly update Congress on the use 
of waivers at high threat posts.  And finally, while recommendations on increased 
funding are proposed by both Congress and the ARB, neither has addressed the merits of 
SED security structures versus Design Excellence.  This may be, in part, a result of 
                                                          
37 “S.1386- Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013: 113th Congress 





Special Mission Benghazi’s status as a temporary facility, rather than a SED or Design 
Excellence Structure.     
A more detailed investigation of risk analysis policy at high threat posts, cyclical funding 
and the Design Excellence program is necessary for a long-term strategy to combat 
security vulnerabilities at diplomatic posts.  As a result, the next section, “background,” 
will provide a more systematic analysis while delving into the costs and benefits of 
sustaining current policy on these issue areas. 
Background 
The State Department’s Diplomatic Security arm remains the chief player and 
stakeholder in the security of embassy personnel and its facilities overseas.   With 
approximately 5,200 direct hire and contracted workers, including 2,000 agents, the 
section overseas approximate 275 diplomatic posts.  Further complicating its mission are 
the 150,000 State Department employees, locally engaged staff (LES), and their family 
members, all of whom fall under the direct responsibility of DS personnel.39 
Fortress Embassies 
It is little wonder then that DS has expressed concern over the growing threats to U.S. 
embassies, concerns which have grown since 1998, when bombings in East Africa 
occurred at diplomatic posts which had not been designated as high threat.  Similarly, 
concerns arose when rumors of a threat caused the closing of 19 diplomatic posts in the 
Middle East and North Africa in 2013, of which “only four of the 19 were designated as 
                                                          
39 Sullivan, Mark, and Todd, Keil and others.  “Report of the Independent Panel on Best Practices.”  U.S. 
Department of State.  August 29, 2013.  Page 2 and Green, Grant, and Melrose, Joseph and others.  “Report 
on Diplomatic Security, Organization and Management.”  U.S. Department of State.  May 2013.  Page 15 
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high threat.”40  Such attacks on non-high threat posts causes serious consternation 
amongst DS personnel, as it fights to place security above aesthetic appeal at our over 
275 diplomatic posts worldwide.41   
But DS has been losing the battle between appearance and security as the Design 
Excellence program has gained traction since 2010.  By attempting to blend security with 
American values and openness, the Design Excellence program has grown in popularity 
with the current administration and many Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) in the field, 
who believe diplomacy, rather than security, should be our top priority.42  However, in 
addition to critics at DS, the program has faced similar criticism from members of 
Congress.  Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) of the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform has been one of these critics, raising concerns about the expediency 
of the new program as well as the costs.    Chief amongst his concerns is whether the new 
Design Excellence program’s security features will actually be more successful at 
protecting our diplomatic facilities. 
Unfortunately, as a relatively new program, there is little data to compare the two in 
terms of their ability to deter attacks.43  Nor is it possible to calculate the number of 
attacks thwarted by the existing security features of the SED program. A more common 
comparison, however, has been the increased time and costs of the DE program versus 
                                                          
40  Sullivan, Mark, and Todd, Keil and others.  “Report of the Independent Panel on Best Practices.”  U.S. 
Department of State.  August 29, 2013.  Page 2 
41 Epstein, Susan and Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: 
Background and Policy Issues.”  Congressional Research Service.  May 28, 2014. Page 4 
42 Burton, Fred and Stewart, Scott.  Counterterrorism funding: Old Fears and Cyclical Lulls.”  Stratfor.  
March 18, 2009.   




SED, which concerned critics argue should be our main concern, as many diplomatic 
facilities remain badly in need of expedient security upgrades 44 
Security experts such as Grant Greene, former Undersecretary for Management at the 
Department and author of a recent State internal report on security, comment that "if it 
takes longer it's going to cost more, and if it costs more and takes longer it puts people at 
risk out there who are waiting for their embassy to be built," Green said. 45 Green and 
other critics have also pointed to the Standard Embassy Design program as being far 
more expedient in building newer, more secure embassies, particularly in light of “DS’s 
already overloaded…task [schedule].”46  The internal report further stresses that using 
Standard Embassy Design in numerous countries, with its small, medium and large 
structure of architecture, makes it easier to formulate counter-attack measures, “co-
locate” facilities in one location to save on costs and train maintenance personnel who 
would otherwise be forced to maintain buildings of various size, structure and 
dilapidation.  Using various design structures in different countries, the report says, not 
only takes additional time and resources, but can make defensibility far more arduous, 
particularly in congested cities.47  
Costs have also become a major concern. After visiting a number of new embassy sites, 
such as the new U.S. embassies in London and Papua New Guinea, still underway as of 
2014, Rep. Chaffetz discovered that both quickly surpassed cost estimates under the new 
program.  In the case of Papua New Guinea, costs have launched from an estimated 
                                                          
44 Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad:  Legislative and Executive 
Branch Initiatives.  Congressional Research Service.  May 7, 2014. Page 10 
45 Ibid and “Are Modern U.S. Embassies Becoming Too Costly to Build?”  CBS News.  June 4, 2014.   
46 Green, Grant, and Melrose, Joseph and others.  “Report on Diplomatic Security, Organization and 
Management.”  U.S. Department of State.  May 2013.  Page 21 




Figure 1: Example of Standard Security Features48 
$50 million to $211 million.  49 
According to DS and State’s Office of the Inspector General, security officials receive 
over 1,000 threats each year, while “50% of all posts [are] considered “critical” or “high” 
under the terrorism category of threat assessment.”50  In such circumstances, as Rep. 
Chaffetz put it, “we don't have time to make sure that the building and the flowers look 
                                                          
48 “Audit of Department of State Compliance With Physical and Procedural Security Standards at Selected 
High Threat Level Posts.”  U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of 
Inspector General.   June 2013. Page 6. 
49 “Are Modern U.S. Embassies Becoming Too Costly to Build?”  CBS News.  June 4, 2014.   
50 Epstein, Susan and Tiersky, Alex.  “Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: 
Background and Policy Issues.”  Congressional Research Service.  May 28, 2014. page 6 and 
 “Review of Best-Value Contracting for the Department of State Local Guard Program and the Utility of 
Expanding the Policy Beyond High-Threat Posts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” United States 




more pretty. We have to make sure that these people are safe and secure and can do their 
jobs.”51 
Risk Management   
Upon the recommendations of State Department’s Accountability Review Board report, a 
panel of security experts convened to form their own report on weaknesses and areas for 
improvement at Diplomatic Security.  Among its recommendations, the panel listed “no 
formal risk management model in place for the use by either DS or the Department” as an 
area of serious concern, as “managers very logically tend to be risk adverse” without a 
risk management system, particularly at high threat posts.  The report further points out 
that “where risk management is not mainstreamed and understood by program and 
security managers across an organization, security is seen as an impediment to mission 
accomplishment rather than as an operation enabler.”52 
To demonstrate, the report lists Special Mission Benghazi as a prime example of where 
risk management could have saved lives.  In such circumstances, when “Inman [standards 
for security] and [the] Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards cannot be met 
either in the short term or ever, [policy has] been to define missions, such as Benghazi, in 
such a manner (special missions, temporary facility) that they are not required to 
meet…[Department] standards.”  Such policies, the report notes, has led to waivers 
becoming “commonplace,” leading to “an unacceptable level of risk.” This has been 
particularly the case, the panel suggests, as the level of risk is not weighed using a risk 
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management formula, preventing a comparative risk scale for sites more dangerous than 
others.53 
Similar concerns were voiced in a 2013 internal memorandum from the Department’s 
Office of the Inspector General regarding the use of waivers.  The memo raises concerns 
that Diplomatic Security does not “regularly review waiver approvals to determine if they 
are still active,” but maintains records of the over 1,000 waiver “exceptions…dating back 
to 1987,” including waivers for facilities that “no longer exist.”   Furthermore, the memo 
notes, “DS …[has no] formal monitoring procedures to determine whether posts are 
requesting exceptions and waivers for all conditions that do not meet security standards,” 
or whether it is in compliance with current “stipulations in exception and waiver 
approvals.”54     
While in the field conducting visits, the security panel report notes that it came across 
critics of a new risk management program, fearing it would lead to “centralized security 
decisions at the Department level and thus impact embassy ability to conduct foreign 
policy in high threat environments.” 55 In response, the panel provided numerous benefits 
to a department-wide risk management system, including mitigating risk by 
“collaberat[ing] with the security component at the earliest stage of program 
planning…identif[ying]…unmitigated risk to personnel, facilities and operations 
considering the program requirements” and causing the management of risk as opposed 
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to avoidance.56   Further emphasizing the severity of the problem, the panel points out 
that if a risk management policy had been in place at the time of the attacks in Benghazi, 
a more balanced analysis could have been made to compare program objectives and 
mitigate risk.57 
Key managers of a risk management formula are likely to be composed of Diplomatic 
Security’s Regional Security Officers ( heads of security at U.S. embassies), who by 
nature of being on the ground at our diplomatic posts are in the best place to implement a 
risk management formula at the local level.  Diplomatic Security also keeps records of 
“compliance with physical security standards and the status of requests for exceptions 
and waivers,” making it the logical choice for management of risk analysis programs at 
new sites.58 Other key actors include the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), also 
within DS and which reports to the National Security Council, which “considers, 
develops, coordinates, and promotes policies, standards and agreement on overseas 
security operations, programs and projects that affect all U.S. Government agencies.”  
OSPB is a likely candidate for the formulation of a risk analysis program at the 
Department, as it currently establishes “physical standards for [various] overseas [U.S. 
government] posts.”59 
On the other hand, opponents may include the Undersecretary for Management, Patrick 
Kennedy, who currently has jurisdiction over decisions to extend waivers to high threat 
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consulate and other “lower-level” posts such as special missions.  Though he has not yet 
expressed reservations about a risk management program, his direct involvement in the 
approval stages could lead to future disagreements over its implementation.60 
Cyclical Funding 
Little can be done to correct security deficiencies at our diplomatic facilities without 
appropriate, and steady, funding.  Both the 1999 and 2012 ARB report directly linked 
cyclical budget lulls as indicative of the lack of “sustained commitment from Congress to 
support State Department needs.”61  This trend, also referred to as the “boom and bust” 
diplomatic security cycle by analysts at Stratfor, reveals the temporary “windfall” from 
attacks, the subsequent increase in Congressional appropriations, which later trickle down 
as the attention ebbs and Congressional budget constraints lead to a final stem in money 
flows.62 
The cycle is further compounded by the Department’s own lack of consistency in 
allocating funds to DS.  As Stratfor analyst Scott Stewart points out, “cuts to the overall 
State Department budget generally result in cuts for security programs.”  As Table 2 
shows, percentage of funding to diplomatic security slowly dwindles as a percentage of 
the Department’s budget when terrorist threats appear to subside.  Later, as attacks hit, 
the percentage of overall Department funding for DS rises steeply and expediently. 
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Table 2: Percent of State Department Budget Allocated to Diplomatic Security (in 
millions)63 
Cost  Center FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 




8,991.2 10,932 12,357.2 11,225.9 
Total Security as 
% of Admin. of 
Foreign Affairs 
Budget 
24% 33% 28% 23% 
Total State Budget  12,501.3 
 
15,079.2 16,423 14,847.1 
% of Total State 
Budget 
17% 22% 20% 16% 
 
Cost  Center FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 




13,371.9 13,467.3 11,680.7 11,614.1 
Total Security as 
% of Admin. of 
Foreign Affairs 
Budget 
31% 35% 40% 41% 
Total State Budget  17,695.3 16,853.6 14,786.4 15,767.8 
% of Total State 
Budget 
23% 28% 32% 30%  
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To remedy the shortfalls in spending, Diplomatic Security and the Accountability Review 
Board have proposed the restoration of the “Capital Security Cost Sharing Program,”64 
which would require all agencies with overseas staff at a particular diplomatic facility to 
“share in construction costs,” with funds prioritized toward high threat, high-risk posts.65 
Also among the proposals for increased cost reduction is a policy of “co-locating” 
chanceries serving in nearby areas.  An oft cited example of this policy is the current 
proposal by State to “co-locate the U.S. Embassy at the Holy See within the U.S. 
Embassy to Italy compound in Rome.”66 
Key players in cyclical funding include the domestic and overseas heads of non-security 
programs at State.  Diplomatic Security has consistently had to defend its security 
considerations against Foreign Service personnel who “believe that Regional Security 
Officers are too risk averse and that they place too many restrictions on diplomats to 
allow them to practice effective diplomacy.” 67  DS agents have also expressed concern 
that since their budget falls under the main Department budget, “senior diplomats, rather 
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than DS Service agents, represent the agency’s interests on Capitol Hill,” leading some 
DS personnel to believe senior diplomats do not have their “best interests at heart.”68 
Other key players include Congressman Royce and Senator Menendez, who are both 
currently proposing embassy security legislation on Capitol Hill in the House and Senate 
foreign affairs committees respectively. Both have expressed interest in increasing 
security funding and will need to be consulted regarding plans for a sustainable spending 
program.69  
Policy Proposal 
Continued threats to our diplomatic posts have presented a number of areas requiring the 
Secretary’s immediate attention.  The shift toward a Design Excellence program and an 
ongoing use of waivers will need to be offset by a new risk management procedure, as 
well as a regular review process to identify new and evolving threats to our overseas 
facilities.  The Department should consider three recommendations to address the 
growing dangers to our embassies.    
 First, this memorandum supports the Department commissioned security panel 
recommendation for a standardized risk-management program, which should be 
put in place to measure the feasibility of conducting diplomacy at all new and 
existing diplomatic posts, particularly those in high threat areas.70  Findings shall 
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be reported by Diplomatic Security to the Undersecretary for Management before 
granting requests for new security waivers, and existing waivers should be re-
evaluated every two years.  In addition, as recommended by S.1386, Embassy 
Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013, the Secretary 
shall update Congress annually regarding high-risk, high threat overseas posts.71 
 Second, the Excellence in Design program, created out of a desire to improve the 
image of our embassies, should not be considered at posts which meet the “high 
threat, high-risk” criteria.  This criterion should be measured using the first 
recommendation’s risk management analysis system.  Chanceries found to be at 
significant risk should be constructed using the Standard Embassy Design (SED) 
standard, to ensure both expediency of construction and adequate safety standards 
at high threat posts. 
 Third, the Secretary should support Senate bill 1368, to increase funding to the 
Capital Security Cost Sharing Program, addressing cyclical funding lulls over a 
10-year period. In addition, the Secretary should implement co-location of 
facilities wherever possible when creating new embassies or consulates abroad.72  
The new risk assessment program will be designed by the Overseas Security Policy 
Board (OSPB).73  As the current standard setter for our overseas facility security 
requirements, the board is aptly suited to formulate a complementary risk management 
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system.  Furthermore, implementation shall be carried out by Regional Security Officers 
who already work at our overseas facility locations, allowing them to formulate the most 
accurate analysis of risk at site. 
The biennial evaluation of waivers shall be carried out by Diplomatic Security, who shall 
report its findings to the Undersecretary for Management.  Considerations for renewing 
security waivers should include updates on evolving facility threats, vulnerabilities and 
the current host country security capabilities.  Upon review, the undersecretary shall be 
required to renew or discontinue past waivers. 
In addition, areas being considered for the Design Excellence program should instead be 
replaced with the Standard Embassy Design structure in areas of the globe which remain 
under high threat.  The SED structures remain the fastest and safest method for designing 
our diplomatic facilities abroad, according to former Undersecretary for Management 
Grant Green,74 and should continue to be the standard for chanceries awaiting renovation 
or relocation in high threat areas.  The risk assessment program should be considered as a 
measure to evaluate which posts should fall under Standard Embassy Design versus 
Design Excellence architecture. 
Finally, the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) program currently requires all agencies 
with personnel at our overseas diplomatic posts to contribute to security cost, with 
funding prioritized toward high threat facilities.75 However, this program has not been 
funded to capacity, and requires Congressional appropriations in order to fund.  Senate 
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bill 1386 would contribute $1.383 billion in funding for CSCS in FY 2014, following 
upon the heels of the ARB recommendation that the Department work with Congress to 
restore CSCS to its “full capacity” and implement a “ten-year program” for consistent 
funding to high threat posts. 76   
Table 3: Capital Security Construction Program, Fiscal Years 2009-2014  
(in millians of nominal dollars)77 
Program FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 
Capital Security Cost 
Sharing 800.5 752.8 579.2 428.2 1,383.00 4,649.40 
 
Policy Analysis 
Standard Embassy Design versus Design Excellence Construction Programs 
Efficiency and Likelihood of Success  
The Standard Embassy Design Structure (SED) has the advantage of being a program 
that was not only tried and tested, but had a reputation of achieving its intended goal of 
upgrading embassy and consulate security standards at a remarkable speed between 
2001-2010.78  Therefore, if the program were to continue, particularly in high threat 
areas, its likelihood of success is high, as it has already been successfully implemented in 
the past, and can be authorized under the Secretary’s existing executive authority.79  On 
the other hand, concerns exist that the isolation of SED sites outside of cities—due to the 
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10-15 acre space requirements—increase the risk to diplomats, as “the resulting long 
drive to work actually made [diplomats] more vulnerable to terrorists,” according to one 
former ambassador.  80 
In 2001, William Miner, then-director of OBO’s design and engineering office, together 
with then-director of OBO Charles Williams, initiated the Standard Embassy Design 
program to address growing threats to our embassies and consulates following the 1998 
West African embassy bombings.81  Prior to its abandonment in 201082, the Standard 
Embassy Design program successfully achieved its goal of expeditiously and efficiently 
constructing diplomatic posts to replace those which did not previously meet State 
Department security requirements.  “Over 100 embassies [were built] using that strategy” 
according to Miner, compared to the glacial speed of construction from 1983-1998, when 
over 75 new embassies failed to materialize due to the inability of officials to uncover 
efficient means of fulfilling the new security standards.83     
Bolstered by its simple, three sized structure design, the SED program conversely 
upgraded facilities badly in need of security alterations, and claims to have quickly 
moved “over 25,840 people out of vulnerable locations and into more secure, safe and 
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functional facilities.”84  Thus, from a likelihood of success standpoint, the SED program 
has a proven track record of efficient implementation. 
 
Figure 2: Standard Embassy Design Architecture at the Embassy of Quito, Ecuador.85 
 
As stated earlier, success in securing our diplomatic facilities using the Standard 
Embassy Design program may be mitigated by what some diplomats argue is the 
increased risk of traveling to remote facilities outside the city, thereby increasing the 
danger embassy and consulate personnel face when traveling to site.  As diplomatic SED 
facilities require additional space, facilities are often located several miles from the 
residential areas of diplomatic personnel.  Unfortunately, as the distance between 
diplomatic facilities and residential areas are different from country to country, few 
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studies exist to verify this claim, though security experts have advised that the distance be 
shortened where possible.86 
Effectiveness 
While even critics admit that the SED program is both expedient and cost-efficient in 
safeguarding our embassies, dissent toward SED architecture tends to center around 
effectiveness when combined with an embassy or consulate’s primary diplomatic 
endeavors.87  In particular, detractors point to the added burden of highly-secure SED 
structures on daily diplomacy, and the affect of bleak-looking US architecture on local 
populations visiting our embassies for the first time.88   
In attempting to implement tight security standards, a side-effect of the SED program, 
according to critics, has been to construct buildings which intimidate locals while 
presenting the wrong image of US values (see Figure 2).89  Indeed, the small, medium 
and large sized structures have frequently aroused ire amongst diplomats and architects 
for their simplistic and imposing appearance, as well as the lack of innovation necessary 
for their construction.   As architectural historian and supporter of the Design Excellence 
program, Jane Loeffler argues, congressman and former ambassadors began criticizing 
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the SED program “even before it began,” with individuals such as “Senator Daniel P. 
Moynihan (D-NY), a former U.S. ambassador to India…advocat[ing] the idea of 
“acceptable risk” for [embassies and consulates] meant to mirror American values.”  His 
concerns highlight the struggle even then against security standards which would impede 
upon diplomatic relations within the host country.  But as Loeffler admits, “it was hard 
for critics to fault [security advocates]” when “the State Department continued to 
chronicle active attempts, sometimes two or three a day, to target U.S. personnel and 
facilities around the world.”  As a result, SED advocates won the day in 2001, “mov[ing] 
thousands of workers to far more secure and modern workplaces.”90  
Critics also argue that the space needed to construct an SED facility—up to 10-15 
acres—prevents diplomats from maintaining a presence in the host nation, and leads to a 
sense of “isolation,” according to both Jane Loeffler and president of the American 
Foreign Service Association’s Journal Susan Johnson. 91  For example, as one former 
U.S. ambassador to Yemen points out, during her term the “new embassy in Sanaa 
prevented diplomats from building ‘essential relationships,’ and observed that the 
resulting long drive to work actually made them more vulnerable to terrorists.92  Critics 
also point out that “no amount of security is adequate ‘where the host government cannot 
or will not protect us.”93  
As a new program, the effectiveness of Design Excellence versus SED security features 
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remains to be seen. 94 A more apt comparison, according to security experts, has been the 
speed at which new embassies are built, and maintaining cost-levels under the SED 
program compared to the new Design Excellence program.  In terms of speed, security 
experts such as Grant S. Green Jr., former Undersecretary for Management and author of 
a new State Department security panel report on embassy security, have voice their 
concern that, “despite schedule/cost assurances from OBO (regarding the Excellence in 
Design program)…fewer facilities…can be built over the same time frame” thus leaving 
more personnel exposed to inadequate facilities for longer periods of time, and that 
“unique designs…requires more time for DS to review the designs and determine 
necessary countermeasures; with DS already overloaded with tasks, the [report] questions 
the advisability of requiring this extra time.”95 Further concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of Design Excellence have arisen from security experts since it was 
reported that “only 80 to 90 [of 175] new [and more secure] facilities” were completed 
between the period of 1998 and 2012.”96    
The question then remains whether Design Excellence can guarantee security and 
timeliness while implementing a more innovative buildings program.  Though the current 
OBO director, Lydia Muniz, believes they can, security experts caution that the extra 
time and cost of the Design Excellence program is virtually guaranteed, with increased 
costs and time delays already arising in the construction of the new U.S. embassy in 
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London, which falls partly under the new program.97  Such delays could have long-term 
consequences, such as preventing badly needed upgrades from being implemented in a 
timely manner at high-risk, high threat embassies and consulates around the globe, 
according Green.98   
Cons 
The negative side of continuing a more SED-focused architectural program, however, 
will be the loss of benefits—such as flexibility to build in urban centers, maximized 
energy efficiency and values-inspired architecture— that former ambassadors and 
historians such as Loeffler believe are advantages of the Design Excellence program. 
As Loeffler states in her defense of the new program, which was published in the 
American Foreign Service Journal, the Design Excellence program presents a number of 
benefits to the work of diplomacy, such as allowing for “acquisition of (smaller) sites in 
urban areas [and] where possible…enhanc[ing] symbolism and accessibility.”  In 
addition, she states, the program would utilize “the latest engineering techniques to 
maximize sustainability and energy-efficiency.”  Finally, she further argues that the 
program would allow the “integration of art (local and American) to showcase cultural 
exchange and enhance buildings and grounds…and care and preserv[e]…historical 
properties and other cultural assets.” 
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But by not supporting the Design Excellence program, there is little likelihood that SEDs 
will be located close to cities, nor will they adapt to local cultural standards, and thus 
could have the potential to damage our image in host countries overseas.99  Furthermore, 
as the embassy in Mexico City is pegged to be the first fully-completed Design 
Excellence structure, the program will have barely left the ground before shifting more 
forcefully toward SED structures in our diplomatic facility construction programs.    100 
Authorization Tool 
Prioritizing Standard Embassy Design over Design Excellence in high threat locations 
can be achieved via the Secretary’s existing executive authority and in coordination with 
the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations.101  The Secretary should have little trouble 
enforcing this, and can continue to implement Design Excellence programs in areas of the 
globe, like London and Mexico City, where the US is particularly concerned about its 
public appearance.   
Risk Management 
Effectiveness 
According to a Department commissioned security panel recommendation, the 
Department needs to put in place a standardized risk management policy in order to 
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ensure a culture of risk management rather than risk avoidance.102     Concerns regarding 
the efficiency of this policy, however, include the fear that a standardized risk 
management policy will lead to centralized decision-making.103 
At present, the Department manages risk by “track[ing] information about each facility, 
assessing threat levels at posts, develop[ing] security standards to meet threats facing 
different types of facilities overseas, identifies vulnerabilities, and sets risk-based 
construction priorities,” according to a Government Accountability Office report.  
However, according to the same report, significant gaps remain in assessing ongoing 
threats and mitigating risk at high threat sites which exist under security waivers.104 
Furthermore, the Department has not followed the ARB recommendation to implement 
mitigating measures before granting waivers for posts at high threat locations, ostensibly 
due to the need for flexibility when conducting expeditionary diplomacy.105   
The benefits, however, to such a policy, have been outlined by at least two Department-
commissioned security reports. 106 Such pros include identifying clear “program 
requirements [and responsibilities] by program managers…[to ensure] close collaboration 
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with the security component at the earliest stage of program planning” and “identification 
of associated resource requirements…[and] mitigating measures to reduce risk.”107 
Conversely, critics of a burdensome risk management system point out that much of what 
diplomacy consists of is expeditious diplomacy, or taking a risk in “just being there,” 
according to a statement by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.108  In other words, 
expeditionary diplomacy exists because even if the risks are high, diplomacy works best 
when the U.S. shows it is willing to show up and give its support to a local cause.  
Because of this, proponents of ad hoc diplomacy are unlikely to approve of a department-
wide risk management system that may prevent them from conducting their jobs 
effectively. 
While justified, concerns remain that expeditious diplomacy has risks, and security 
officials argue they should have a say as to when the risk has grown too great.  For 
instance, Mark Sullivan, author of one of the Department’s recent security panel reports 
and a 35 year veteran as a Federal Agent puts it, “there may be…a requirement to 
conduct critical programs in an environment where the residual risk is so severe that there 
is a high likelihood its implementation will result in death or serious injury.”  In such 
instances, Sullivan adds, DS should work with senior Department leaders to evaluate the 
feasibility, or necessity, of implementing the critical program.”109 
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An instance when risk management could have significantly altered the course of events 
for embassy staff was the lead up to the deadly events of Special Mission Benghazi in 
2012.   As security expert Grant Green puts it, “had an effective risk management model 
been in use at the time the decision was made to extend the special mission in Benghazi, 
the action memorandum would have detailed the program objectives, threats, 
vulnerabilities, and the security measures required to mitigate the risk.”  Had such an 
analysis taken place, Green argues, “the Department would then have been able to 
determine if the level of risk was acceptable considering the expected outcome.”110  
Instead, the mission continued unheeded, as Ambassador Chris Stevens “presence in the 
city was seen as a significant sign of U.S. support [for the Libyan Transitional National 
Council], and recognition of the resurgence of Eastern Libya’s political events.”  
Eventually, this expeditionary diplomacy would culminate in Steven’s death.111  
Efficiency, Administrative Capacity, and Likelihood of Success 
Currently, Department personnel share risk management responsibilities; while “program 
criticality is determined by program managers, risk are determined by security 
managers.”112 Thus a standardized risk management system could be implemented by the 
Regional Security Officers (RSO) who already have responsibilities over risk assessment 
as security managers, in conjunction with OBO, the country program managers.113  Such 
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a program can be authorized by the Secretary under his executive authority granted in the 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.114  However, concerns 
exist that DS already has a risk management system, which it has not implemented, and 
that ongoing measures to track evolving threats are plagued by delays.115  
The likelihood of successfully implementing a risk-management program can be 
measured by ongoing attempts to assess risk at embassies and consulates today.  A recent 
Government Accountability Office report notes that DS “created a risk management 
policy statement in 1997…[but has] not fully developed and implemented the policy.”  
Amongst the reasons for this— the Department “risk management statement lacks clear 
roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders and detailed guidance on how to carry out 
its elements.”  116 Thus in order for this policy to succeed, a valid and clear guideline on 
how to share responsibility would need to be put in place. 
An additional concern includes present monitoring of security standards.  For instance, 
the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), the current standard setter, is currently 
required to review its standards “at least once every 5 years” to evaluate “evolving threats 
and risks” to our embassies and consulate abroad.   However, in reality, OSPB only 
reviews its policies following the events of an attack or serious injury, leaving State 
Department security personnel at OBO and DS to “implement security standards [which] 
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exceeded security requirements,” since, as one RSO puts it, the OSPB “standards are 
inadequate to mitigate against risks faced by some high threat, high-risk posts.”117  Thus, 
if OSPB were to establish standardized risk management procedures, as this 
recommendation suggests, and fail to regularly review evolving threats identified by DS, 
the standardized risk management process could be derailed, or ignored, entirely.   
To adequately address this concern, this recommendation will need to include measures 
which require OSPB to regularly review its risk management procedures.  As an 
“interagency body created to assist the Secretary in carrying out the statutory security 
responsibilities prescribed by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 
1986,” the Secretary of State can enforce a requirement that OSPB regularly review its 
standards on an annual or bi-annual basis, to ensure credibility.118 
As for implementation itself, as current RSOs work successfully with OBO to assess risk, 
and “take additional steps on their own…to implement security measures that exceed 
OSPB standards” when they do not match site-specific needs, RSO have proven they 
have the capability and flexibility to implement a more nuanced standardized risk 
management system.  But without a successful OSPB risk standardized system, “security 
measures are up to the professional judgment of post RSOs [alone], an ad hoc process 
that does not draw on the collective subject-matter expertise of DS and the interagency 
OSPB.”119  Thus a successful process would incorporate a regularly updated risk 
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standardized system, created by OSPB, while allowing some flexibility for RSOs to 
assess unique threats at their local sites.   
Cons 
The greatest drawback to a risk management system would be the flexibility it could take 
away from diplomats participating in ad hoc, or expeditionary diplomacy in high-risk 
areas.  As diplomats attempt to show their support for local causes, or attempt to 
negotiate important trade deals and reconstruction projects, an overly burdensome risk 
management system could impede their ability to travel to sites deemed high-risk, 
thereby thwarting important diplomatic achievements requiring flexibility.   
In 2011, the Department began awarding service awards for “expeditionary diplomacy,” 
which is given to those who serve in high-risk areas, thus encouraging diplomats to take 
charge of the situation despite associated risks that might be involved.  120  However, the 
ability of diplomats to perform in such environments may be frustrated by the risk 
management system, as local RSOs may decide that the associated risks are too high for a 
diplomat to continue his activities at a high-risk site, despite the potential benefits.  Thus, 
it is likely that at least some diplomatic endeavors, or possible achievements, will be 
prevented due to this new risk management system. 
Critics of an overly burdensome risk management program, such as State Department 
scholar Jane Loeffler and Susan Johnson, also point out that the risks are not as great as 
Diplomatic Security would have you believe.  In a report on the Design Excellence 
                                                          




program, Loeffler quotes Johnson in saying that the focus should instead be on 
“diplomatic discretion,” which is “now often severely constrained by security regulations, 
and recognition of “acceptable risk,” understood by diplomats but hard for the public to 
tolerate.”  She further quotes Johnson as saying that “no one suggests confining all city 
police officers to walled compounds…but the risk of dying in the line of duty for a 
Foreign Service Officer is roughly equal to the risk facing a D.C. police officer.” 121 Thus 
Loeffler and Johnson, as well as the diplomatic community they refer to, would surely be 
opposed to another risk management procedure, as it could further complicate their 
ability to perform official duties and have a negative impact on our foreign relations 
agenda. 
Authorization Tool 
A risk management program, regularly updated by OSPB and implemented by program 
managers and local RSOs within State, can be authorized under the Secretary’s executive 
authority.122  The Secretary should implement a Department policy whereby OSPB 
creates a standardized risk management program for all Department overseas personnel, 
and require updates on a one to two year basis.    
The Secretary should also support S.1386, which would require the Department to update 
Congress annually on the number of high-risk, high threat posts.  This will help ensure 
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security waivers are not used excessively and help prevent a repeat of the Special Mission 
Benghazi incident.  123 
Cyclical Funding Constraints 
Effectiveness and Likelihood of Success  
The third recommendation—ensuring long-term funding through the Capital Security 
Cost Sharing (CSCS) program and co-locating agencies in one facility—would provide 
for an enduring solution to the cyclical funding reprieve of State Department budget 
requests. 124  “Non-State” Department skeptics of the program, however, point out that 
charging agencies based on the number of stationed personnel at our chanceries could 
prevent those agencies from carrying out their mission, and that a better method for 
distributing costs could be chosen.  Furthermore, according to a GAO report, “State is 
also concerned that, without cost sharing, OBO could overbuild office space due to 
agencies’ imprecise staffing projections.”125 
The Capital Security Cost Sharing program arose as early as 2000, when OBO initiated 
the program to address the serious need to upgrade security standards at its facilities.  
However, the program lost steam until the events of Benghazi shed light on security 
funding deficiencies at State.  In response to its findings on the matter, the Accountability 
Review Board recommended that the Department “restore the Capital Security Cost 
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Sharing Program to its full capacity, adjusted for inflation, of $2.2 billion in 2015, for up 
to a 10 year period” by ensuring that each agency contribute in accordance with the 
number of personnel it authorizes to serve at our chanceries overseas.126  Such a program 
would allow State to maintain prioritized funding for high-risk, high threats sites for at 
least a decade.127  
Agencies contributing to these costs outside of State complained, however, that the 
“head-count” system of attributing costs to agencies was poorly formed, but should 
instead be based off of such costs as amount of space used per year.128  These complaints, 
accentuated by recent demands for additional cost sharing, were voiced in a Government 
Accountability Report as early as 2004.129 
In response, OBO officials have “stated that they preferred the head-count formula, 
largely because it would best meet the primary goals of accelerating embassy 
construction and promoting rightsizing of U.S. agencies’ overseas staff, would be simple 
to implement, and would avoid agencies’ relocating overseas personnel to avoid or 
reduce cost-sharing charges.”  130  Thus concerns regarding implementation and 
effectiveness may be mitigated by the simplicity of the program while promoting fair-
share approaches to cost-saving for each of the agencies involved. 
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As for difficulties projecting space requirements by non-State agencies, the Department 
believes the CSCS program could use the head count system to offset incorrect 
projections by agencies on the number of personnel they would need at a particular 
facility in the future.131  The problem of providing enough space for future staffing 
projections is also offset by the use of SED facilities, which utilize greater amounts of 
space than traditional embassies and consulates, to ensure security requirements are 
met. 132 
Equity 
The GAO report on cost-sharing also listed equity as a concern for the Capital Security 
Cost Sharing Program (CSCS).  For instance, the report notes “non-State” agencies have 
complained a mediation entity needs to exist to resolve disputes regarding an agency’s 
contribution to the program, as well as to “ensure accountability and equity, and consider 
improvements to the program.”133  At present, such an entity does not exist. 
Cons 
Despite the bipartisan support and the high monetary contributions of S.1386 ($1.383 
billion would be authorized for FY2014), the Capital Security Cost Sharing program 
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suffers from one major drawback: its reliance on annual appropriations from Congress.134  
And while Congress shows a strong willingness to maintain CSCS funding now, history 
has shown that funding for the program in the past has dwindled over time (See Table 3 
on Page 21).135 
By requiring that the program’s funding be re-assessed each year, there is no guarantee 
that the program will avoid the cyclical funding issues which have been blamed for 
security failures in the past.136  Such failures can occur for a variety of reasons, but are 
most often the result of Congressional efforts to reign in spending.  Such was the 
argument of Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah), senior Oversight Committee member and critic of 
the Benghazi security failure, when questioned on his vote to cut embassy security 
funding between 2010-2012.  As he put it in October of 2012, “we have to make 
priorities and choices in this country. We have…15,000 contractors in Iraq. We have 
more than 6,000 contractors, a private army there, for President Obama, in Baghdad. And 
we’re talking about can we get two dozen or so people into Libya to help protect our 
forces. When you’re in tough economic times, you have to make difficult choices. You 
have to prioritize things.”137  Thus, as future political headwinds change, the Capital 
Security Cost Sharing program could once again lose its current level of appropriations 
from Congress, and thus muffle its impact in the long-term.  
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The Capital Security Cost Sharing fund has been suggested in both legislative proposals 
listed earlier in this memo.  Both H.R. 2484 and S.1386 would authorize additional 
funding to the program.  138  As for co-locating facilities, the Secretary can work with 
OBO to ensure that, wherever possible, facilities are co-located, ensuring greater office 
space and saving on the security costs of additional facilities. 
Political Analysis 
Prioritizing Standard Embassy Design for High Threat Diplomatic Facilities 
Pros 
The political benefits of prioritizing Standard Embassy Design facility architecture for 
our diplomatic facilities are numerous.  First, ensuring that our embassies and consulates 
are secure may improve the Democrat’s overall prospects for the presidential election in 
2016, particularly if former Secretary Hillary Clinton, who was criticized for her handling 
of Benghazi, is a candidate.  Second, this project will alleviate concerns from the House 
Oversight Committee, which is concerned that the US is not doing enough to secure our 
diplomats.  And lastly, this program may improve Secretary Kerry’s long-term political 
prospects, as the media and public opinion have focused closely on his ability to prevent 
a re-occurrence of the attacks in 2012.139 
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In 2012, shortly after the attack on Special Mission Benghazi, Republicans such as Darrel 
Issa and John Boehner criticized the handling of the attack and questioned why more 
security had not been present to thwart a potential attack.140  Ensuring that the 
Department is doing something to prevent future security breaches would provide a 
strong defense against future critics, particularly as Democrats prepare for the 2016 
presidential election.  More specifically, as Secretary during the attack, Hillary Clinton 
could face repeated criticisms if nothing is done to address security vulnerabilities at our 
diplomatic sites, as the problem will appear unresolved. 
Similarly, the House Oversight Committee has focused a great deal on embassy security 
at our diplomatic facilities.  Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah), a senior lawmaker 
on the committee, has consistently pointed to the need to increase security at our 
embassies, and has criticized the Design Excellence program for being too focused on the 
appearance of our embassies while ignoring the need for security upgrades.141  Thus 
prioritizing this program could prevent an ongoing headache to the administration in the 
form of highly-publicized weaknesses exposed by the Oversight Committee. 
And lastly, in the wake of the attacks, public opinion polls from the Economist/Yougov 
have shown that only 20% of Americans are “very confident” that the administration is 
taking the right steps to prevent another attack on our diplomatic facilities.142   By 
prioritizing Standard Embassy Design facilities, Democrats can demonstrate that they are 
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upgrading our facilities in record time and ensure that the necessary precautions are being 
taken before the next presidential election.  Meanwhile, the Department can continue to 
use Design Excellence in highly-visible locations, such as the embassy in London, 
Beijing and Mexico city, so as not to abandon a project Secretary Kerry once supported 
altogether. 
Cons 
The greatest political resistance to prioritizing SED structures is likely to come from 
within the Department.  First, the director of OBO, Lydia Muniz, is unlikely to support a 
shift away from Design Excellence, as it is a project that she has promoted since 
becoming director.  Second, Democrats such as the current Secretary have previously 
voiced significant support for the Design Excellence program, so backing away too far 
could be an admission of failure and damage the Secretary’s credibility.143  
The Design Excellence program has had significant support from within the 
Department— diplomats and academics have written extensively on the benefits of 
having a welcoming embassy for those who have never been to the U.S. or are coming 
for the first time.  And while Diplomatic Security has vehemently opposed the program, 
many within the Department have not.144  Thus reversing course on the number of 
facilities designed under the Excellence in Design Program could have a damaging affect 
on morale and on the Secretary’s own popularity within the Department. 
                                                          





Prioritizing SEDs over Design Excellence may also undercut one of the strongest 
defenders of the Design Excellence program, director of the Bureau of Overseas Building 
Operations Lydia Muniz. 145 And while reversing direction on her program would not 
damage Kerry’s legacy by itself, it could open up questions as to whether the security 
features of Design Excellence, which have not been proven up to this point, are actually 
effective.  Thus if not handled carefully, the gradual shift away from Design Excellence 
could open up new questions from the Oversight Committee on how effective the limited 
but already planned Excellence in Design Facilities in London and Mexico City are at 
securing our facilities.146  Should weaknesses be exposed in Design Excellence, it could 
be a costly and highly-visible mistake on the administration and on former Secretary 
Clinton in the lead up to the 2016 presidential election. 
Risk Management   
Pros 
On the pros side, a risk management program is unlikely to face any political resistance, 
as it has been suggested by two highly influential security reports since the 2012 attacks, 
and has little to no opposition outside of the Department.147  In addition, a risk 
management program would have significant support from the Department’s Diplomatic 
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Security and the Government Accountability Office, who have both produced their own 
reports detailing the need to better assess risk.148  
A risk management system, which would allow for more informed decision-making, 
particularly when engaging in diplomacy in high threat areas, is unlikely to face any 
resistance or open the administration to criticism.  On the contrary, managing risk as 
opposed to avoiding risk has been demonstrated by one of the Department-commissioned 
reports on security to be a far more effective means of preventing future security 
threats.149 
Members of Diplomatic Security will also support the program, as it has been part of 
their own recommendations, and allows them to have a voice when diplomats engage in 
high-risk operations.   By allowing Diplomatic Security to weigh-in on high-risk 
diplomacy, the Department can ensure that security officials have had an opportunity to 
voice caution and suggest risk mitigation strategies, thus reducing the potential for 
disaster.150 
Cons 
There is potential for resistance, however, from the diplomats within the Department who 
promote the use of “expeditionary diplomacy.”151  As former Secretary Clinton and 
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influential scholar Jane Loeffler might argue, based off of prior comments,152 the 
existence of significant risk cannot be a prohibiting factor by itself, as diplomats often 
need to take risks to show support for a local cause.  Thus as these individuals would 
argue, having a restrictive risk management system could prevent diplomats from doing 
their job, particularly when a diplomat determines that the benefits of diplomacy 
outweigh the risks.  
As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once indicated, one of the most important 
things a diplomat can do is to be present to show American support for local 
initiatives.153  Such was the case when Ambassador Christopher Stevens, who while 
attempting to show support for a local cause, was killed in an attack on a poorly fortified 
facility.  Thus despite security weaknesses, the Secretary may face resistance from 
diplomats who are concerned that a risk management policy will centralize decision-
making. 154  And while security concerns may be valid, should this lead to missed 
opportunities in diplomatic relations, Secretary Kerry could face later criticisms both 
within and outside the Department regarding his failure to make significant trade or 
political diplomatic agreements due to an overly burdensome security process. 
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The greatest political benefit of the Capital Security Cost Sharing program is that it has 
bi-partisan support, having been sponsored by two separate legislative proposals, each 
from separate parties.155  As security at our embassies became a hot-button issue, both 
parties have shown a willingness to increase funding to our embassies. 156  Therefore, 
supporting the authorization of this program is unlikely to face any near-term political 
resistance from Congress. 
Both H.R. 2848, sponsored by Edward Royce (R-CA) and S.1386, sponsored by Senator 
Menendez (D-NJ) have included provisions which would extend additional funding to the 
Capital Security Cost Sharing program.  Supporting either one is unlikely to provoke a 
political backlash from Congress, and this recommendation’s suggestion that the 
Secretary choose S.1386 contains the added benefit of the sponsoring agent being from 
the Secretary’s own Party.157 
Media and public opinion are also likely to favor the program, as much focus has been on 
Congress’s failure to adequately fund State’s ongoing attempts to secure its facilities. 158 
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Thus the Secretary should act now to support such legislation while intense scrutiny is 
focused on Capitol Hill. 
Cons 
As earlier described, Congressional resistance to the Secretary supporting legislation on 
this matter is expected to be minimal.  However, agencies required to contribute to 
security costs under the program could become a new voice of criticism for how the 
Department chooses to secure its facilities. Moreover, as the program prioritizes funding 
for high-risk, high threat locations, the Secretary could face renewed criticism from 
contributing agencies who disapprove of Design Excellence architecture programs in 
those areas.159 
Current OBO policy is unclear as to how it will design future facilities in high threat 
locations.  However, should the over 30 contributing agencies (see Figure 3) find that the 
Department is using costly and non-time effective architecture for these sensitive high 
threat locations, the Secretary could face significant criticism from a broad array of U.S. 
Departments and independent agencies. 
In addition, as the Government Accountability Office reported back in 2004, frustrations 
already exist regarding how agency contributions are determined, and could be 
exacerbated if agencies do not believe their funds are being used effectively.160 Thus 
using this program could limit some of the Department’s options on how it chooses to 
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secure its facilities, as contributing agencies may decide to publicly criticize Secretary 
Kerry regarding the use of its funds, thus potentially damaging the Secretary’s long-term 
political legacy.   
 Figure 3: List of Agencies Contributing to the Cost Sharing Program 161 
Recommendation 
In order to ensure future security to our embassies and consulates, the Secretary should 
use his executive authority to implement a standardized risk management program, 
formulated by OSPB, implemented by RSOs and local program managers, and submitted 
to the Undersecretary for Management. The OSPB should establish clear roles and 
responsibilities for implementation, and review its standards every 1-2 years.  
Furthermore, the Secretary should report to Congress annually on the number of high 
threat overseas posts.   
                                                          
161 “FY09 Capital Security Cost Sharing-Slide Presentation.”  U.S. Department of State Archive.   Dec. 
2008.  Slide 19 
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Second, all new construction programs should be constructed using the above risk 
management program; those found to be at high-risk should not be considered for the 
Design Excellence program, but instead using the far more expedient and cost-effective 
Standard Embassy Design.   Facilities should also be co-located when possible, to further 
save on costs and guarantee adequate security for all departments operating overseas.   
And finally, support should be given to S.1386, which would authorize $1.383 billion to 
the Capital Security Cost Sharing program for FY 2014, and ensure long-term costs for 
security upgrades are distributed amongst all agencies   
Though the appearance and accessibility of the Design Excellence program has recently 
gained popularity within the Department, greater priority should be given to preventing 
another terrorist attack on our embassies before the 2016 presidential election.  Thus 
while the Design Excellence program should be continued in highly-visible and 
strategically important trade sites—such as our embassies in Beijing, London and Mexico 
City— OBO should otherwise shift back to the SED program, particularly in high threat, 
high-risk locations.  The SED program’s expediency and cost-effectiveness makes it ideal 
for upgrading our vulnerable facilities.  Furthermore, by supporting this recommendation, 
which has support from Diplomatic Security and senior members of the House Oversight 
Committee, the Secretary will demonstrate that he is taking embassy security 
vulnerabilities seriously in the wake of attacks on Special Mission Benghazi.162 
                                                          
162 Are Modern U.S. Embassies Becoming Too Costly to Build?”  CBS News.  June 4, 2014 and Green, 
Graham Jr. and Melrose, Joseph Jr. and others.  “Report on Diplomatic Security Organization and 
Management.”  U.S. Department of State.  May 2013 
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Similarly, a standardized risk management program will allow our security experts a 
voice in diplomatic activities involving unnecessary risk.  While not ideal for our efforts 
in expeditionary diplomacy, this program will ensure local RSOs and program managers 
can work together to mitigate or avoid high-risk activities at the earliest stages.  By 
standardizing our risk management system and assigning clear roles of responsibility, the 
program should allow local diplomats and security officers to make objective decisions 
regarding the costs and benefits of a particular diplomatic endeavor.  The potential for 
missed short-term trade or political achievements should not excuse inadequate risk 
assessments, particularly when the threat of future injury or death is high. 
Finally, the Capital Security Cost Sharing program should be supported to help prevent 
another gradual decline in security funding.  By distributing costs amongst participating 
departments, the program is less likely to face sharp congressional budget cuts during 
periods of budget wrangling.  And while Congressional funding may ebb over time, it 
should not prevent the Secretary from supporting proposed increases to our security 
budget while attention is turned our way following recent attacks.  Similarly, while the 
over 30 participating agencies may criticize our use of security funds, their distributed 
contributions toward funding high threat diplomatic facilities is necessary to help prevent 









CSCS- Capital Security Cost Sharing 
SED- Standard Embassy Design 
DE- Design Excellence 
OBO- Bureau of Overseas Building Operations 
FSO- Foreign Service Officer 
RSO- Regional Security Officer 
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